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Abstract 
The topic of this paper focuses on proactive versus reactive business ethics performance in 
the marketplace. The internal perception of a corporation and the external perception of the 
same corporation are used as generic determinants of business ethics performance. In turn, 
they are underpinned by evolutionary and contextual issues in the marketplace. The authors 
provide a generic conceptual framework of proactive and reactive business ethics 
performance. Case illustrations underpin the positives and negatives of proactive and reactive 
business ethics in the marketplace. A profile analysis process of proactive and reactive 
business ethics performance is also outlined. The gap between the internal and external 
perceptions of a corporation’s actions becomes crucial to achieve successful business ethics 
performance in the marketplace. Therefore, a corporation’s current business ethics 
performance should always be regarded as an on-the-spot-account that is either proactive or 
reactive. An important insight of this research is that business ethics performance requires the 
ongoing re-connection with reality by corporations. 
Introduction 
The revelations of transgression by high profile corporations has once again led society to 
focus on the practices of its major corporate entities. The activities of these famous 
companies have now led to them becoming infamous. The list reads like a who’s who of US 
business: Enron, Worldcom, Arthur Andersen, Xerox, Merrill Lynch. 
In each one of these situations, the point of interest focuses on the incredulity of society at the 
unethical and in some cases illegal behavior that has been revealed. In many of these cases, 
we have seen impassioned and eloquent defenses of the corporation’s behavior: behavior that 
to many others has been reprehensible. The main perpetrators appear to be less than contrite 
in their acceptance of responsibility for their actions and that of their corporations. 
How could these business executives have perpetrated these acts of deceit with such an 
apparent disregard for those individuals that they would affect? How is it that their business 
ethics performance could be so far wide of acceptable business conduct? How could they 
have so misread the mood of the society as to the severity of their behavior? These questions 
perplex and confound us, as we continue to witness, from generation to generation, the same 
indiscretions wrapped in different circumstances with different actors, but no less 
recognizable as the same unacceptable business conduct. How can business executives and 
the actions they perpetrate in the names of their companies be so wide of the mark in respect 
to societal expectations of business behavior? While this paper does not attempt to answer 
these conundrums, it does focus upon the need for business executives to consider that there 
are two perspectives that must be considered in all situations: the corporation’s view and the 
society’s view. Not to consider the perspective of both groups is an omission of the highest 
order and invariably sets the scene that leads to the inevitable dereliction of duty and self-
centered decision making that in the end unravels for the corporation and the society and 
leads to the inevitable reality that all parties lose. 
In this article, the authors examine this “gap in business ethics performance”. This gap can be 
expressed as the internal perception of the employees of a corporation concerning an ethical 
scenario in the marketplace, as compared to the external perception of the same corporation’s 
performance in respect to the same scenario by the marketplace and by the society in general. 
We contend that one needs to consider both evolutionary and contextual issues to form a 
comprehensive picture of the situation. Consequently, the outcome of business ethics 
performance is based upon two generic determinants, namely one internal determinant (i.e. 
the internal perception of a corporation) and one external determinant (i.e. the external 
perception of a corporation). These determinants are generally applicable across companies 
and across different industries. Therefore, there is a genuine justification to examine and 
develop a generic conceptual framework surrounding them in the marketplace. 
The objective of this article is to conceptualize and describe the business ethics performance 
of corporations based upon the internal and external perceptions of corporate actions in the 
marketplace by considering different contextual and evolutionary issues. The dichotomy of 
internal and external perceptions is the source of proactive and reactive business ethics 
performance. Proactive business ethics refers to a “step-ahead” performance of the internal 
perception in relation to the external perception, while reactive business ethics refers to a 
“step-behind” performance, where the corporation lags behind accepted societal expectations 
in a given situation requiring ethical behavior. 
Frame of reference 
Townsend and Gebhardt (1997) write that the way that corporations go about their business 
activities, with particular respect to business ethics performance, is increasingly important to 
their customers. Customers in the marketplace are becoming increasingly aware of, and 
increasingly discriminating against, corporations that fail to meet the customers’ criteria of 
acceptable versus unacceptable ethical business activities and management principles. We 
would contend that this concern does not just apply to customers, but to all stakeholders of 
the corporation and the society in general. Therefore, the topic of business ethics performance 
and the gap between the internal and external perceptions of the corporation is an important 
issue to discuss and for which to develop a generic conceptual framework. The frame of 
reference is divided into contextual and evolutionary issues. 
Business ethics performance – contextual issues 
Business ethics performance is surrounded by contextual issues (Figure 1), since the business 
environment certainly will affect what are acceptable and unacceptable business activities 
and management principles in the marketplace. A generic contextual issue of business ethics 
performance in the society is culture (Svensson and Wood, 2003). Generally, the actors, the 
activities and the resources in the marketplace form another group of contextual issues (e.g. 
Håkansson and Snehota, 1995; Håkansson, 1987). In particular, the environment, the 
atmosphere and the interaction are influential contextual issues on a corporate level of 
business ethics performance (Håkansson, 1982). Some of these influences are from the 
society, the industry in which the corporation operates, the corporation mores and the norms 
and behavior of individuals within the corporation. The impact of contextual issues of 
business ethics performance is more or less implicit or explicit in a managerial setting. 
In the field of business ethics, studies on international and national levels have been 
performed considering different contextual issues (e.g. Jakubowski et al., 2002; Fisher et al., 
2001; Seitz, 2001; Peppas and Peppas, 2000; Singhapakdi et al., 1999; Fernandez-Fernandez, 
1999). Singhapakdi et al. (1999) argue that business ethics are of pivotal importance in 
international business, since an individual’s culture and perceived context influences their 
business ethics decision making. The study reveals some significant differences between the 
national contexts examined. Failures to address these differences between contextual issues 
even within one’s own culture may affect one’s business ethics performance in the 
marketplace. 
Fisher et al. (2001) examine the stances of Indian and UK managers towards ethical issues at 
work. Eight ethical stances were defined. These stances were based upon two dimensions: 
 degree of ethical integrity; and 
 dialectic of ethical purpose. 
The tentative findings are that the Indian managers’ ethical stances are similar to those of 
Western managers, but they are more likely to experience ethical tension between their 
personal, espoused stances and those they take at work. 
Bucar et al. (2002) develop a conceptual framework for the examination of cross-cultural 
differences in ethical attitudes of business people based upon the assumptions of integrative 
social contract theory. The study reveals the relevant cultural and economic norms that are 
predictive of the level of the ethical attitudes among societies and at the same time they point 
out the more subtle impact of social institutions on ethical attitudes of different groups within 
a society. Sen (1997) examines the role of cultures in influencing norms of business behavior 
and argues for the need to recognize the complex structures of business principles and the 
extensive reach of moral sentiments. 
Vinten (1998) argues that business ethics has the potential to become a significant aspect of 
corporate strategy and culture. Business ethics has to be considered internally and externally 
in the ethical audit for it places the corporation’s value system in its cultural and societal 
context. This idea needs to be explored further. We contend that the reasons for the 
malpractice that we continue to see in the corporate world are centered upon the self-
indulgent, introspective and myopic perspectives of companies that are not able to transform 
their thoughts to consider all possible perceptions and ramifications of their actions: thoughts 
that are transfixed on corporate and/or personal self-interest to the exclusion of other possible 
options. 
The frame of reference has suggested the managerial importance of considering the impact on 
business ethics performance in the marketplace of contextual issues. In particular, business 
ethics performance may therefore be seen as an inter-personal, intra-corporational, and inter-
corporational on-the-spot-account based upon the gap between the internal and external 
perceptions affected by contextual issues. 
Business ethics performance – evolutionary issues 
Business ethics performance is also surrounded by evolutionary issues (Figure 2). A generic 
contextual issue of business ethics performance in the society is time (Svensson and Wood, 
2003). Another one is change. The only constant is change. The contextual issues such as the 
actors, the activities and the resources in the marketplace are influenced by the evolutionary 
issues. Furthermore, the environment, the atmosphere and the interaction are also affected on 
a corporate level. The evolution of contextual issues in the business environment certainly 
will affect what are acceptable and unacceptable business activities and management 
principles in the marketplace. The impact of evolutionary issues on business ethics 
performance is more or less implicit or explicit in a managerial setting. 
Kilcullen and Kooistra (1999) focus on the changing role of business ethics and corporate 
social responsibility in the business environment. The study indicates that there appears to be 
a change occurring among corporations that is seeing them move from unacceptable conduct 
towards acceptable ethical business activities and management principles. Unfortunately, 
there are other corporations that still continue to behave unacceptably in the marketplace. 
They do not read the signs or do not wish to read the signs that are happening in the general 
society and/or the marketplace. They make this omission at their own peril. 
Giacalone and Knouse (1997) argue that businesses should use a holistic approach to 
business ethics. In order for a corporation to be fully committed to business ethics, its 
leadership must foresee what potential problems might occur and then act in a way to prevent 
such problems from occurring by implementing three sub-processes: 
 corporational; 
 job related; and 
 cultural. 
Yamaji (1997) states that business ethics should not just be a corporate code, but 
implemented in the line of business as a corporate philosophy and he attempts to show that 
these activities are ahead of the times resulting in greater prosperity for the corporation that 
uses them. McDonald and Zepp (1989) also write that evolutionary corporate strategies can 
influence the ethical behavior of employees, in respect to such areas as code of ethics, ethical 
policy statements, leadership, ethical ombudsperson, ethics committees, realistic performance 
and reward plans, and an ethical culture. A growing number of corporations are devoting 
attention to evolutionary issues in business ethics. These companies are trying to move 
themselves towards an ethical business philosophy in the expectation that ethical behavior by 
their employees will result. 
Within the frame of reference we have also suggested the managerial importance of 
considering evolutionary issues on business ethics performance in the marketplace. In 
particular, business ethics performance may therefore be seen as an inter-personal, intra-
corporational, and inter-corporational “on-the-spot-account” based upon the gap between the 
internal and external perceptions affected by evolutionary issues. The world is changing in 
many ways. These ways are often driven by technology. As our society evolves, then one can 
expect as a consequence that its members will expect and even demand more ethical behavior 
from its business leaders and their corporations. To not recognize this progression can be a 
fatal omission from both the corporate philosophy and the subsequent approach of the 
corporation to the marketplace. 
A generic conceptual framework of proactive and reactive business ethics performance 
This section introduces a generic framework that conceptualizes and describes two generic 
determinants of business ethics performance in the marketplace, namely the internal and 
external perceptions. In addition, the conceptual framework stresses the underlying 
contextual and evolutionary issues of the consequences of proactive and reactive business 
ethics performance. Altogether, the conceptual framework provides insights into proactive 
and reactive business ethics performance. 
The conceptual framework is restricted to business ethics performance in the marketplace, 
which means that ethics in the society is beyond the scope of its contribution. Although the 
topic in focus is restricted to business ethics performance, parts of the conceptual discussion 
also may be applicable and useful to ethics in other contexts in the general society. 
Determinants of business ethics performance 
As evolution has progressed and the society has made contextual advances, these actions of 
themselves have created new ideological structures in the minds of citizens. The growth in 
education in industrialized economies has led individuals to question what they see around 
them and to articulate their views in such a way that members of the society continually 
challenge the society’s moral precepts. As evolutionary issues pass and contextual issues 
evolve and become more complex, the by-product of such developments is a re-examination 
of the social constructs that underpin the mores and values of the dominant groups within the 
society. People ask why and why not, as they challenge the boundaries of societal 
acceptability. These issues influence the internal and external perceptions of all actors in the 
marketplace (Svensson and Wood, 2003). 
Two generic determinants influence the outcome of either proactive or reactive business 
ethics performance in the marketplace, namely the internal and external perceptions of a 
corporation (see Figure 3). As the internal perception of business ethics performance 
develops, the external perception evolves and as a consequence the outcome of business 
ethics performance may change. In conjunction, these two determinants create a generic 
conceptual framework and also contribute to underpin the sources of proactive and reactive 
business ethics performance in the marketplace. 
Consequently, reigning values, norms, and beliefs in the marketplace shape business ethics 
performance. Therefore, business ethics performance should be seen as an on-the-spot-
account of the continuous gap between the internal and external perceptions of that which is 
viewed as ethical in the marketplace. 
Sources and consequences of proactive and reactive business ethics performance 
Business ethics is rooted in the concepts of the philosophical underpinnings of ethics. The 
focus is upon the same philosophical questions, but with business activity as the medium of 
interaction, thus, the conceptual discussion of business ethics is linked to a micro level in the 
society. This means that the internal perception is a point of reference for the forthcoming 
discussion of business ethics performance in the marketplace. The internal perception may be 
that of the employer, the employees and/or the owners/shareholders. Another point of 
reference is the external perception. The external perception may be that of the customers, the 
suppliers, and/or other publics. 
The internal perception should at least match the external perception to avoid reactive 
business ethics performance. If there is a mismatch between the internal and external 
perceptions a gap occurs. This gap is referred to as ‘the gap of business ethics performance’ 
(see Figures 4 and 5). Preferably, there should be a proactive gap of business ethics 
performance, i.e. the corporation is a step ahead of the current values, norms, and beliefs in 
the marketplace and in the society, otherwise, an unethical situation might occur. A reactive 
gap of business ethics performance occurs when the corporation is a step behind the current 
values, norms, and beliefs in the marketplace. The latter is a generic source of reactive 
business ethics (see Figure 4). Accordingly, reactive business ethics performance occurs 
when the internal perception is reactive to the external perception of what is acceptable or 
unacceptable in the marketplace. 
Proactive and reactive business ethics performance is an interactive phenomenon that 
depends upon contextual and evolutionary issues, such as existing values, norms, and beliefs 
held by the internal and external participants in any ethical scenario. Eventually, proactive 
and reactive business ethics performances are about what the internal and external 
participants judge (i.e. relatively) as acceptable or unacceptable conduct in business, at a 
specific contextual and evolutionary stage. Consequently, what is appropriate business ethics 
performance is determined by both the internal and external perceptions of the actions taken 
in respect to the situation faced. These are separate social constructions that may differ 
between the parties involved in a specific contextual and evolutionary situation. 
The most troublesome ethical dilemma for a corporation occurs when it is a step behind 
current values, norms, and beliefs in the marketplace. This situation might have a severe 
impact on the corporation’s business activities. Therefore, proactive business ethics 
performance should be inherent in all business activities. Proactive business ethics occur 
when the internal perception is proactive in relation to the external perception of what is 
acceptable or unacceptable in the marketplace. 
The internal perception of a corporation is also linked for other reasons to the external 
perception of others in the marketplace and of course in the society. For example, the internal 
weaknesses or strengths of a corporation’s business ethics performance affect the external 
threats and opportunities in the marketplace. The business ethics performance in the 
marketplace has its origin in the internal perception of a corporation. Weaknesses in the 
internal perception may convert into threats in the external perception (see Figure 6). 
Therefore, proactive business ethics performance is crucial for long-term business success in 
the marketplace. 
Strengths in the internal perception may convert into opportunities in the external perception 
(see Figure 7). Reactive business ethics performance exposes the corporation to risks in the 
marketplace. The consequences of weakness and strength in the internal perception are 
dependent upon the contextual and evolutionary issues surrounding the external perception of 
threats and opportunities in the marketplace. Therefore, the accurate internal analysis of 
weaknesses and strengths of the corporation’s business ethics performance is crucial to the 
external analysis of threats and opportunities. 
A profile analysis process of business ethics performance 
The previous components of the generic conceptual framework of proactive and reactive 
business ethics performance as illustrated in Figures 1-7 construct a process of profile 
analysis. The profile analysis process is dependent upon the contextual and evolutionary 
issues in the marketplace, which means that each situation or occasion is unique and has to be 
managed individually. We postulate in Figure 8 our contentions concerning the profile 
analysis process of business ethics performance. 
The process of profile analysis consists of four different but interconnected parts, namely: 
 contextual and evolutionary issues – it begins with the characteristics in the 
marketplace all of which frame the whole process and its outcome; 
 internal perception – consists of internal analyses of weaknesses and strengths of the 
corporation’s business ethics performance. In addition, it considers if the current 
business ethics performance is acceptable or unacceptable in the marketplace. This is 
an inside-out perspective; 
 external perception – consists of external analyses of threats and opportunities of the 
business ethics performance. In addition, it considers if the marketplace regards the 
current business ethics performance as acceptable or unacceptable. This is an outside-
in perspective; and 
 contingency planning – evaluates if the gap of the current business ethics performance 
is proactive or reactive based upon the internal and external perceptions of the 
performance of the corporation and the consequences for all that result. 
Case illustrations 
The generic conceptual framework of proactive and reactive business ethics performance 
introduced in the previous section is supported in this section by a number of real-life cases. 
These cases illustrate the influence that proactive and reactive business ethics performance 
has on corporate actors, activities and resources in the marketplace. 
The Joe Camel case 
The Joe Camel case (Jennings, 1993) between 1913-1997 centers on the use of a cartoon 
character in order to position cigarettes as an acceptable product of choice for the youth 
market. The Joe Camel advertising campaign re-launched by RJ Reynolds in the late 1980s 
was so successful that it lifted the Camel brand name in sales from 2.7 percent to 3.1 percent 
market share. 
At the same time, the corporation also attracted the ire of the US Surgeon General who was 
opposed to what appeared to be a blatant attempt to make Joe Camel “cool” and thus appeal 
to the youth market. In three US studies, as reported in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association, as many children aged six recognized Joe Camel as recognized Mickey Mouse. 
At the time of the Joe Camel campaign more damning evidence of the health concerns of 
cigarette smoking was coming to the fore. 
Profile analysis of business ethics performance 
In March 1992, the Center for Disease Control reported that smokers between the ages of 12 
and 18 preferred Marlboro, Newport or Camel cigarettes. These were the three brands where 
advertising was the most extensive (i.e. weakness). To target cigarette advertising at children 
was not seen as acceptable by many people in society at the time (i.e. threat), yet it required 
the risk of legal action to be taken that finally led to the campaign not continuing (i.e. 
reactive). Joe Camel was discontinued in 1997 as an advertising medium and cigarette 
packets now carry extensive health warnings. 
The Challenger case 
The Challenger disaster (Desjardins and McCall, 2000) in 1986 was a national tragedy in the 
USA. The build up to and the expectation surrounding the flight of school teacher, Christa 
McAuliffe, had gripped the nation. The public was horrified to see the explosion one minute 
and 13 seconds after take off, and the fact that it claimed the lives of the seven astronauts. 
After the initial shock, people were looking for answers. It would appear that safety was 
compromised for the holy grail of commercial expediency. On this occasion, NASA was 
under more than usual pressure to deliver a successful mission. On the night before the flight, 
Roger Boisjoly of Morton Thiokol once again expressed his concerns and abject reservations 
about launching the shuttle in the weather conditions that were to prevail on the day of the 
launch. Under extreme pressure he was asked to compromise his professional judgement and 
to think subsequently from a management perspective which in itself was code for everyone’s 
self centered need to think first of the “commercial good” of the venture. He relented and 
gave the all clear for the flight. 
Profile analysis of business ethics performance 
The irony of this situation is that his prophecy did eventuate as Boisjoly had predicted (i.e. 
weakness). He testified before the Rogers Commission, where he provided detailed 
information of his concerns (i.e. threat): concerns that he had communicated to his 
management at least a year earlier. Boisjoly had his job responsibilities at Morton Thiokol 
downgraded. Eventually, he left Morton Thiokol as the corporation made his continued 
employment untenable. The public believed that to take such a risk with seven lives for a 
successful space flight was too high a price to pay. NASA had to restructure its security 
procedures and routines before each launch of the space shuttle (i.e. reactive). 
The Exxon Valdez case 
The Exxon Valdez case (Ferrell and Fraedrich, 1991) in 1989 is synonymous with the 
destruction of a pristine environmental habitat through corporate malpractice. The shipping 
disaster became an ecological disaster when 11 million US gallons of crude oil was spilt into 
Prince William Sound. The blame was placed upon the ship’s captain who had a documented 
alcohol problem. He had handed over command of the vessel to a junior officer who it 
appeared made some incorrect maneuvers and in the middle of the night ran the carrier 
aground. 
The CEO of Exxon, Lawrence Rawl, reacted inappropriately when he did not comment on 
the spill for nearly six days nor did he appear at the scene of the disaster. He had misread the 
mood of the nation and the power of the environmental lobby. The ecology of the area was 
severely damaged as were the livelihoods of the communities that depended on the pristine 
sound. The corporation agreed to a clean up plan that was seen by many as inadequate. As the 
investigation into the disaster unfolded, it was discovered that the safety equipment 
supposedly in place to contain spills was inadequate and costs had been saved in this area 
over the years by not maintaining the safety plan and the condition necessary of the 
equipment that should have been there. 
Profile analysis of business ethics performance 
An interesting part of the case is that for US$22 million the tanker could have been double 
hulled which would have contained the spill. As a shipper of crude oil around the world, they 
had not correctly understood their responsibilities (i.e. weakness), nor the backlash against 
them that would occur. The corporation was lagging in its appreciation of the impact of 
environmental safety issues on the US public (i.e. threat). The subsequent costs to Exxon are 
conservatively numbered in the hundreds of millions of dollars (i.e. reactive). 
The Ford case 
The Ford Pinto case (Jennings, 1993) between 1968-1979 was to be Ford’s newest foray into 
the subcompact car market. The car was to weigh less than 2,000 pounds and to cost less than 
US$2,000 and it was to be made in quicker than normal time. This directive was immutable 
and corners were cut and costs kept to a minimum in order to fulfil Lee Iacocca’s dream. The 
dilemma was that the car had a problem with its fuel tank in certain types of impact 
situations. It had the propensity to catch on fire. 
Prior to its launch in the marketplace Ford was aware of this problem. The corporation 
conducted a cost benefit analysis based on the cost of recall versus the cost of indemnifying 
victims for the damages that would result when inevitably the cars would catch on fire. 
Projected costs for death and injury were considered in the calculations. Based on the savings 
implicit in not initiating a recall of the Pinto, the corporation continued to place the car in the 
marketplace. People started to notice a pattern with the Ford Pinto and car fires from rear or 
rear side impact. In 1979, Ford was indicted by the State of Indiana for reckless homicide. 
Profile analysis of business ethics performance 
People could not believe that any US corporation, let alone one of its icon motor 
manufacturers, could conceive of a cost benefit analysis that traded the value of the human 
life of potential customers off against minor modifications to a car that the corporation knew 
was inherently unsafe (i.e. weakness). Ford did not just misjudge, but completely missed the 
sentiment of the society by such a long distance (i.e. threat). At the end of the day, Ford had 
to reconsider its business principles to match the opinion in the marketplace (i.e. reactive). 
The Johns Manville case 
The Johns Manville case (Jennings, 1993) between 1887-1992 is not centered on a once off 
experience, but is a scenario comprising institutional neglect and intransigence over many 
decades. The dangers of asbestosis were known as early as 1AD and reported by Pliny the 
Elder and Strabo. In the 17th and 18th centuries, European medical professors doing 
autopsies upon stone cutters documented severe respiratory problems. By 1918 the US 
government was interested in the phenomenon. 
Johns Manville conducted its own studies in the 1930s and they too were aware of the 
insidious nature of the product that they mined. Unfortunately, they did not communicate 
their knowledge to their own employees. They sponsored research grants on the provision 
that the results would not be made public. They compromised the integrity of academic 
research so that their secret would not be discovered. In the 1930s, they paid out some 
compensation to victims but also continued to market their products. 
Worker rights were not as developed in the 1930s as they were to become from the 1970s 
onwards. It was this evolution in the rights of employees that would eventually lead to the 
exposure of Johns Manville. The result was that in 1982 Johns Manville filed for Chapter 11 
as a tactic to protect itself from lawsuits. “The bankruptcy proceedings continued through 
1989 when Manville and others agreed to the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust. 
Under the agreement, Manville was required to give $2.5 billion in assets (mostly stock) to 
the trust. Manville was also required, beginning in 1991, to pay $75 million to the trust 
annually as well as 20 percent of its annual net income each year” (Jennings, 1993, p. 138). 
Profile analysis of business ethics performance 
This case shows the evolutionary progress made in workers’ rights in the later half of the 20th 
century. Generations of managers hid the truth (i.e. weakness). The price of doing business in 
the end was vast and lasting for the corporation (i.e. threat). The interest in this case is that it 
was about a corporation who went one step further than exposing its customers to harm: it 
knowingly and for a prolonged period of time also disregarded the health and safety of its 
own workforce. It also shows a corporation that knowingly suppressed the truth for many 
decades and that had no real qualms about its expendable workforce (i.e. reactive). 
The Nestlé case 
The Nestlé infant formula case (Jennings, 1993) between 1975-1992 was one of the first 
cases to mobilize activists from around the world for a boycott of the products of a 
multinational corporation. The infant formula issue was a simple one. Nestle was one of a 
number of companies marketing its infant formula to lesser-developed countries of the world. 
Some of these companies employed women who dressed up as nurses, but who were not 
nurses, to go into the hospitals and convince mothers that milk formula was a better way to 
go than the traditional breastfeeding of their children. Mothers readily accepted this 
“professional advice” and opted for the infant formula. This was not a problem when they 
were in hospital, but when they left hospital they found that they faced a number of potential 
problems. They could not properly refrigerate the product; nor could they necessarily afford 
the formula and hence, would dilute it; and/or they did not have the proper sanitary 
conditions to prepare the product. By the time that the mothers had discovered a problem 
their own milk had dried off leaving their children often in desperate need. 
Profile analysis of business ethics performance 
Nestlé capitalized on people’s desire to improve the lot of their children with this new first 
world initiative without ensuring in the long term that these new consumers could adequately 
afford and/or use the product safely (i.e. weakness). The corporation was singled out by 
activists and in 1975 it sued. The media coverage was enormous and led to not only boycotts 
of Nestlé products, but also to attempts to have a code of practice for infant formula 
marketing implemented in the industry. The abhorrence by many to this situation was that 
large first world multinationals appeared to be trading on the lives of the youngest and most 
helpless in lesser developed societies: its children. Many in the world wondered if capitalism 
could stoop much lower in its quest for customers and profits (i.e. threat). Nestlé had to 
change its business strategy in lesser developed countries (i.e. reactive). 
The Tylenol case 
The Tylenol case (Jennings, 1993) in 1982 had the potential for a major disaster for the 
corporation. Six people died in the Chicago area as a result of taking Tylenol capsules that 
had been laced with cyanide. The tablets had been tampered with and unsuspecting customers 
took them for pain relief. When the tragedy was revealed Tylenol reacted immediately. They 
withdrew all of their stock of the offending tablets right across the USA. This action would 
cost them approximately US$150 million in lost sales in the first year. The corporation would 
not take any chances with its product or with its consumers. The corporation and the CEO of 
Johnson and Johnson, Jim Burke, were lauded by then President Ronald Reagan for their 
actions. 
Profile analysis of business ethics performance 
Tylenol implemented a full product recall. They believed that their ethical principles meant 
that they could not compromise on product quality and hence product safety (i.e. strength). 
As a result of these concerns, the corporation developed tamper proof packaging, which in 
itself was socially responsible (i.e. proactive). Within a year their re-launched product had re-
captured its 40 percent of market share. They had however, captured a bigger prize than 
market share: the ongoing trust of the US people (i.e. opportunity). 
The Union Carbide case 
In 1984, Bhopal became famous because of a toxic chemical leak into the surrounding district 
from a Union Carbide pesticide factory (Jennings, 1993). The effects on the people who lived 
in this poorer district of Bhopal surrounding the factory were devastating. Upwards of 3,500 
people died from the gas cloud that enveloped the area and two hundred thousand others were 
blinded, burned, or left with lesions in their respiratory systems. The ongoing health related 
issues were predicted to be of an extreme magnitude. The corporation had located its factory 
in Bhopal because of low labor costs, very low taxes and safety standards that were much less 
stringent than those required in the USA. 
The corporation at first reacted quickly and positively to the tragedy. CEO, Warren 
Anderson, offered to assist the Bhopal community. Not only did he promise quick relief, but 
he personally offered to devote the rest of his career to the Bhopal situation. As time went on 
and it became clear that Union Carbide was responsible for the tragedy the offers of support 
evaporated and the situation turned into one of legal dimensions. In the following year, as a 
result of its falling share price, Union Carbide had to spend US$3 billion to stave off a 
takeover bid. In 1986, Anderson was indicted by an Indian court in order to answer charges 
of culpable homicide. His lawyers claimed that the court had no jurisdiction. 
This defense raises the pertinent issue concerning the misguided belief that it is acceptable to 
do business in a country, but that one is not subject to the laws of that country. This 
perception smacks of the “extraterritoriality concept” imposed on 19th century China, where 
foreigners (a synonym for westerners) could not be tried under Chinese law for crimes 
committed in China. In effect, it quarantined these foreigners from the law of the land and 
removed the sovereign powers of the Chinese government of the time to enforce its own 
social order. One would have thought and hoped that this type of implicit xenophobia would 
have mellowed by the 1980s, especially amongst employees of a multinational corporation. 
The bizarre twist would be to see the reaction if the same defense had been used in the USA 
in such circumstances by a foreign corporate executive. One wonders at the validity of the 
claim and the subsequent voracity of US officials and the society to see justice done. 
Profile analysis of business ethics performance 
In 1992, with the threat that Union Carbide was about to sell its stake in India a magistrate 
seized all of Union Carbide’s Indian assets. Union Carbide had been in Bhopal since 1969 
and had assisted the Indian government by keeping the plant going after 1980, even when the 
plant was making losses (i.e. reactive). This was a magnanimous action to take, but the 
corporation did not take its safety responsibilities as seriously as they should have (i.e. 
weakness). In spite of their quasi-philanthropic gesture since 1980, they still faced derision at 
home in the USA because of the magnitude of the disaster and the public’s reaction to Union 
Carbide’s position (i.e. threat). 
The Volvo case 
The Volvo case (Svensson and Wood, 2003) runs between 1927 until today. The car 
manufacturer has a long tradition of focussing upon the safety of its products. Volvo was 
founded in 1927 and the founders of Volvo stated a few years later, when safety issues in the 
automotive industry were ignored, that (Volvo, 2002, p. 1): 
… Cars are driven by people. The guiding principle behind everything we make at Volvo 
therefore, is – and must remain safety …  
Three areas are applied to fulfil Volvo’s safety philosophy: 
 active safety (i.e. driving safety) – the characteristics and equipment which help the 
driver avoid accidents whenever possible; 
 passive safety (i.e. crash safety) – the whole of the car body and the interior are 
designed to protect all the occupants when an accident takes place; and 
 protection (i.e. for people and property) – designed to improve protection from car 
thefts and threats to the car owner on his/her way to and from the car (Volvo, 2002, p. 
1). 
Since 1970 almost 30,000 accidents where Volvo cars have been involved have been 
analyzed. The standards for safety required by Volvo are far more comprehensive than the 
legal standards that are mandated. They go beyond the law and lead public perception to what 
is possible in car safety. The aim is to save lives, alleviate the effect of injuries, or preferably, 
to prevent accidents ever occurring (Volvo, 2001). 
Volvo has included features in their cars that the market did not as a whole necessarily 
believe that it needed. Some of the features included in their cars other carmakers only 
included after there was legislative intervention. For example, Volvo introduced safety belts 
in to Sweden in 1959. The legislative intervention in Sweden for front seat safety belts 
occurred in 1975 and for back seat safety belts in 1985 (Volvo, 2002). Volvo has been a 
world leader in a number of safety areas. These areas include a triangular two-circuit brake-
system in 1966; day-running lights in 1975; lap-diagonal safety belt in the back middle seat 
in 1986; side impact protection system (SIPS) in 1991; integrated child cushion in 1992; 
SIPS-bag in 1994; inflatable curtain (IC) in 1998; and whiplash protection system (WHIPS) 
in 1998 (Volvo, 2002). 
Profile analysis of business ethics performance 
Safety has been at the forefront of all that Volvo has done, since its inception. Safety and 
Volvo are synonymous. Volvo pursued safety issues well before they were palatable in other 
companies. They led the market and the society in terms of making safer cars. One could be 
cynical and laud this concept as a profitable strategic marketing initiative, but this may be 
over-simplistic. Volvo appears to have had a genuine concern for its consumers (i.e. 
strength). Volvo has established a reputation for safety that in its obvious extension means a 
concern for their customers (i.e. opportunity). This focus has benefited the corporation since 
its inception. This concern led Volvo to implement safety features that not only challenged 
the market, but that established a positive business ethics gap performance with consumers 
(i.e. proactive). The public trusts Volvo and its products to deliver as safe a motoring as is 
possible (Svensson and Wood, 2003). 
Case summary - profile analysis of business ethics performance 
The case illustrations are briefly summarized in Table I. The table highlights the four 
components of the introduced process of profile analysis of proactive versus reactive business 
ethics performance. 
Generally, the cases (i.e. 1-6 and 8) illustrate that the internal consequences of the situation 
that occurred in the marketplace were misjudged. The perceived internal strengths of the 
contextual and evolutionary issues in the marketplace were wrongly recognized as acceptable 
by the corporation. Therefore, the external consequences of the contextual and evolutionary 
issues turned out to be unacceptable in the marketplace. The internal perception was a step 
behind the external perception. In conclusion, reactive business ethics performance 
dominated the corporate contingency planning in these case contexts. 
The other two cases (i.e. 7 and 9) illustrate that the internal consequences of the situation that 
occurred in the marketplace were judged correctly. The perceived internal weaknesses of the 
contextual and evolutionary issues in the marketplace were interpreted as unacceptable by the 
corporation. The external consequences of the contextual and evolutionary issues turned out 
to be acceptable in the marketplace. The internal perception was a step ahead of the external 
perception. In conclusion, proactive business ethics performance dominated the corporate 
contingency planning in these case contexts. 
Concluding thoughts and suggestions for further research 
At any given point in time, all businesses face the dilemma of reading the mood of the 
marketplace and the society. Environmental scanning is practiced throughout the world as a 
means of ensuring that one is in touch with the moods and events going on around you. To 
misread the current environment is a critical corporate error, that in itself leaves the 
corporation open to the vagaries of the marketplace. With their products in mind many 
corporations try to lead the market and tune into the moods of the society in order to obtain a 
competitive advantage. If one suggested that corporations should be reactive to the 
marketplace and not proactive in the marketplace one would be seen as recalcitrant. 
Corporations need to take the same proactive response to their ethical values as they do to 
their product positioning. Business ethics cannot be an afterthought in a corporation’s 
planning. 
In this paper a conceptual framework has been proposed and case illustrations have been used 
to lead the reader to a number of conclusions that might be drawn. First of all, business ethics 
performance is dependent upon the contextual and the evolutionary issues in the marketplace. 
Therefore, business ethics should be interpreted as a continuous process. It is ongoing and 
needs to be viewed as such. Second, the importance of continuously considering the gap of 
business ethics performance, i.e. the match or mismatch between the internal and external 
perceptions cannot be overstated. Business ethics performance is only an “on-the-spot-
account” in the marketplace: a marketplace that changes more or less drastically over time. 
Third, the consequences of internal weaknesses and strengths become threats and 
opportunities in the marketplace. Therefore, proactive business ethics performance wins in 
the long run, while reactive business ethics performance loses. Business ethics performance 
may be seen as a “reconnection with reality” when corporate management has gone astray or 
lost contact with the relative association between the internal and external perceptions in the 
marketplace. Finally, business ethics per se is not proactive or reactive. It is the performance 
of the corporation that is either proactive or reactive. Corporations need to be mindful of the 
role of business ethics in their everyday activities. They need to be ever vigilant. 
A consideration of one’s corporate business ethics cannot be left until a major crisis arises, 
for a lack of preparation both philosophically and practically will leave the corporation 
unduly exposed. The desire of corporation’s to protect themselves first and then to examine 
the impacts on other stakeholders in itself leads to reactive business ethics rather than 
proactive business ethics. The very litigation and poor public relations experience feared by 
corporations invariably comes to fruition. As we have attempted to show in our cases in this 
paper, corporations can suffer immeasurably from these poor, self-centered decisions: 
decisions which taken in a reactive manner often lead to financial hardship that may appear at 
first to be out of all proportion to the initial issue of concern. Yet, society judges these actions 
and the actors involved harshly, if social mores are flouted and self-interest predominates. 
Caveat emptor has been a tenet of corporate business for years in respect to products and 
services, but in the case of business ethics it is a case of corporation emptor. Corporations are 
on notice that business ethics needs to be viewed from a proactive approach and not one of 
constant catch up. 
We postulate further that business ethics research would benefit from exploring why 
companies in the marketplace continuously fail to maintain a proactive gap of business ethics 
performance. A focus on the consequences could be built upon the internal weaknesses’ and 
strengths’ impact of the external threats and opportunities in the marketplace. In addition, the 
focus on the sources of proactive and reactive business ethics performance would make a 
fruitful contribution to the current knowledge in field. These sources may be categorized as 
either economic or non-economic. They could also be traced to the presence of interactive 
versus non-interactive features between internal and external perceptions of a corporation in 
the marketplace. 
 
Figure 1Business ethics performance - the impact of contextual issues 
 
Figure 2Business ethics performence - the impact of evolutinary issues 
 
Figure 3Determinants of buesiness ethics performance 
 
Figure 4A source of the reactive gap of business ethics performance 
 
Figure 5A source of the proactive gap of business ethics performance 
 
Figure 6A consequence of reactive business ethics performance - internal weakness becomes 
external threat 
 
Figure 7A consequence of proactive business ethics performance - internal strength becomes 
external opportunity 
 
Figure 8A profile analysis process of business ethics performance - proactive versus reactive 
 
Table IA summary of case illustrations – profile analysis of business ethics performance 
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